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Introduction 
 
The Arctic is undergoing rapid changes that generate increased 
geopolitical attention and foster conflict potential. With climate change 
severely affecting the region, new opportunities to exploit resources 
and to exert geopolitical influence will result in the coming years. As 
global warming lets the Arctic ice cover melt, new resources such as 
offshore oil and gas but also new or shorter transport routes become 
accessible. Although it is still uncertain when, and if, suspected 
resources are actually exploitable, as most of them likely are within 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), a number of states have come 
forward with their interests and claims. Some Arctic coastal states see 
their national security and sovereignty at risk, and they have taken 
action to bolster security. The Arctic faces growing conflict potential in 
the realm of security. 
 
While the region has seen a significant level of cooperation in some 
areas in the past, current developments seem to motivate both stronger 
risk representations and confrontational actions. Among the coastal 
states, particularly Canada, the United States, and Russia are 
increasingly expressing points of contention and articulating risk 
representations. At the same time, they are engaging in military and 
hard-security activities that raise the potential for actual conflict. 
Activities include an increase in militarization in the region, new 
surveillance capacities and military bases, aggressive behavior among 
some coastal states, and increasing articulations regarding the 
preparedness to defend interests also by force. The UN-Convention of 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives the Arctic coastal states, which are 
Canada, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, and the U.S., 
sovereign rights. Yet, also China as non-Arctic state is by now highly 
active in the region. China defines itself as near-Arctic state, 
increasingly claims Arctic interests and backs these up with actions. It 
may aim to circumvent the Arctic legal order. Intensifying risk 
representations and increasing confrontational actions make conflict 
potential in the Arctic more likely.  
 
The article delves into risk representations and confrontational actions 
in the Arctic to assess how these foster conflict potential. To follow the 
article’s proceeding, a brief outline on the research design and on terms 
is in order: The article refers to the Arctic coastal states of Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States. The terms of Arctic 
Eight or Arctic states include the coastal states, plus Finland, Iceland 
and Sweden – these eight have territories above the Arctic Circle and 
are members of the Arctic Council (AC). The article focuses on Canada, 
the United States, and Russia, as these coastal states are the most 
dominant regarding risk representations and confrontational actions. 
In a separate section, the article deals with China. As non-Arctic state, 
it has no legal status in the Arctic, which warrants a discussion apart 
from coastal states. China is of interest though, as it is asserting Arctic 
interests and taking notable actions. The article focuses on the hard-
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security dimension at the state level with a view to regional stability 
and conflict potential. With a focus on security, it stays away from a 
thorough discussion of environmental politics. The applied term of 
conflict potential refers not to outright war, as that is unlikely, but to an 
increasing contestation and tension that may come to involve military 
means.  
 
The Arctic is also a maritime space. Due to this, and because of the 
space-identity nexus, the analysis considers constructions of space and 
identity in discourse on the Arctic. To assess risk representations, and 
confrontational actions taken, the analysis has analyzed discourse and 
action at the state level. As argued by scholars, it is national decision 
makers who are in a privileged speaker position to create geopolitical 
images and visions that form the basis for action. Texts such as policy 
and strategy documents inform on how national decision makers view 
and represent their state, risks, interests, and policy needs.1 The article 
works with small case studies to illustrate the discourse and action at 
the state level that is of interest here. Scholars see case studies valuable 
for gaining a detailed understanding of an issue and of complex 
relations in a qualitative approach. The unit of analysis can also be 
nations.2 The analysis focused on texts that center on the Arctic, 
including security and Arctic strategies and executive statements. 
Thematically relevant and current assessments by scholars and think 
tanks complement these. Risk representations are part of discourse, 
also at the state level, and they become active and material by forming a 
strong basis of action; as such, they can shape conflict potential.3 The 
article argues that strong risk representations foster conflict potential 
and make actual conflict more likely. Existing conflicts of interests and 
confrontational actions are also the result of risk representations and in 
turn strengthen these. 
 
The article proceeds with a conceptual section on the significance of 
risk representations and constructions of space and identity. The 
empirical section on the dynamics of conflict in the Arctic begins with 
recent developments in the Arctic. It discusses risk representations of 
the three coastal states Canada, the United States, and Russia, then the 
confrontational actions of these states, and the impact of China. The 
final section offers implications regarding the rising conflict potential 
in the region.  
 
Risk Representations and the Role of Space and Identity 
 
Risk representations form a basis of tension and conflict. References to 
and constructions of space and identity are a frequent element in risk 
representations. The term of risk representations refers to how another 
actor is represented as risk to the self, and how in international 
relations another state is represented as risk to the own state or to the 
world. Risk representations are part of human discourse and thus part 
of discourse by national decision makers vis-à-vis their state and other 
states in international relations.4 This article follows the premise that 
discourse has constitutive effects, meaning that representations in 
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discourse – of self and other and with various qualitative descriptions 
and ascriptions – shapes meaning-making processes, interpretation, 
action potential, and policy formulation. Analyzing discourse enables 
an understanding of how we socially produce and naturalize contingent 
meaning, and how speakers offer specific meaning, explain, and 
justify.5 Not only humans, but also states define their relations with 
each other by identifying with and differentiating from multiple others. 
The differentiation from others can form the basis for tension and 
conflict, in particular when differentiation occurs in a way where 
hierarchy and dichotomies come to define relations. Thus, when other 
states are represented as risk or threat, and the own state as superior, 
tension is promoted. Exploring risk representations enables insights on 
factors promoting tension, including how (national) identity is defined 
vis-à-vis friends and foes, how references to space and spatial ordering 
are institutionalized into action, and how insecurity and conflict are 
created.6 The approach here agrees with scholars who argue that it is 
not a matter of causal mechanism, but rather of a discursive force or 
“discursive agency” that influences perception, interpretation, and 
policy.7 The key interest here lies on how certain meanings and actions, 
from among other possibilities, become thinkable, resonant, and 
dominant in policy formulation.8 Regarding policy towards other states 
then, it is a matter of how risk representations create certain policy 
orientations, and how these can foster conflict potential. 
 
Both space and national identity have a political and security 
dimension. The reference to space here means how a state relates to its 
territory and its considered sphere of influence, in discourse, policy, 
and action. Considering how space is viewed and politically framed can 
enable a better understanding of how political actors approach regions 
such as the Arctic. Space is politically produced and applied to 
represent the self and promote national interests vis-à-vis other states; 
it thereby becomes meaningful and material, and informs policy 
formulation and action.9 An illustrative example of strong spatial 
constructions is U.S. discourse: it exhibits strong self-other 
differentiation, a sphere-of-influence approach, and action well beyond 
U.S. territorial borders that connect with spatial ordering and strong 
power assertion. U.S. national identity, with American exceptionalism, 
a global leadership claim, and a sense of invincibility, underlies 
discourse.10 Furthermore, the manner of representation of spatial 
constructions, such as boundaries and delimitations, informs about the 
perception and use of spheres of influence. Considering these 
representations can generate insights on the potential for ‘collisions’ of 
such spheres. Efforts taken to increase own space serve as a political 
tool for national interest promotion.11 Such efforts aim at power 
assertion and spatial ordering for own benefits. When actors link these 
to hierarchical and antagonistic representation towards other states, 
they may facilitate tension and conflict.12  
 
Relevant to the Arctic are also identity constructions, as they illustrate 
how a state defines itself vis-à-vis other states in the Arctic. Spatial 
constructions and spheres of influence are part of national identity. 
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When speaking about states here, the article refers to the national 
decision makers who are socialized in the context of national identity, 
who represent their state vis-à-vis other states, and whose actions form 
from the perspective of national identity. Scholars see national identity 
a key factor for policy formulation towards other states, and thus as 
influence on interstate relations. Political actors communicate their 
state’s place in the world, along with friends and foes, risks and 
threats.13 When decision makers represent another state as risk or 
threat to the own state, it constitutively affects relations. Since identity 
forms in differentiation from others, national identity comes with the 
creation of difference and dichotomies.14 Difference and dichotomies, 
and their political use, affect interstate relations and promote tension. 
In the context of interstate tension, also confrontational actions by 
states are relevant. Even a security dilemma might develop – a spiral of 
escalatory steps taken by states based on perceptions and 
interpretations of other states’ intentions and capabilities. In a revised 
reading of the security dilemma, scholars speak of a two-level strategic 
dilemma in a context of ever-present uncertainty that also involves the 
dilemma of arriving at the most fitting response.15 Some coastal states 
may indeed find themselves in a security dilemma context, insofar as 
perceptions and interpretations of developing risks to own interests, 
security, and sovereignty grow stronger. They then become part of risk 
representations and shape actions more confrontational. The study of 
risk representations in a geopolitical context, also attending to space 
and identity factors, is valuable in uncovering discursive processes of 
constructing friends and foes, and of creating insecurity and conflict.16 
Insights into such processes and their motivations can be helpful in 
pointing to ways of alternative, less divisive discourses in order to 
prevent or reduce conflict. 
 
Dynamics of Conflict in the Arctic 
 
Before delving into risk representations and confrontational actions in 
detail, this section presents a background on recent Arctic 
developments. There is certainly cooperation in a number of policy 
areas, and the solving of minor territorial disputes.17 Yet, there are also 
increasing tension and conflicts of interests. Scholars point to growing 
geopolitical power games, the expansion of national territorial and 
energy policies of several coastal states, rising conflicts of interests, and 
the planned development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with 
inherent destabilization potential. They also see more chances for 
military incidents occurring, and a new level of militarization and 
aggression.18 Even external events can affect regional security. The 
Ukraine crisis, with Russia annexing Crimea, has not only deteriorated 
relations in the AC with Russia. It has also weakened cooperation in the 
AC, and resulted in a slowing and/or pausing of plans regarding the 
Northern Chiefs of Defense Forum and the Arctic Security Forces 
Roundtable.19 Furthermore, the Arctic region’s export orientation for 
oil and gas presents a potential risk, because the involved 
dependencies, market dynamics, and energy security issues can 
facilitate geopolitical tension.20 However, a simple rush for resources 
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may not take place, as coastal states differ in their Arctic resource 
interests.21 Scholars have also considered various visions of and for the 
Arctic, pointing both to multiple understandings of the region and a 
more global context. They speak of a history of and continuing 
potential for cooperation, but also of developments that can spoil 
cooperation, including tension in US-Russian relations or the uncertain 
future role of Asian and other states with Arctic interests.22 Others 
highlight the complexity facing the region, including the multiple 
changes from a warming climate, effects on territorial rights, 
sovereignty and maritime borders, and the future handling of sea 
routes. The generation of interests, and the actions by non-polar states 
to benefit from Arctic resources also pose challenges.23 Some also point 
to Antarctic cooperation as offering lessons for the Arctic.24 However, 
the two regions differ greatly, as the Antarctic Treaty has put aside 
territorial claims. All these challenges and questions, and others, may 
offset stability in the region. The article explores some of these 
developments.  
 
Most states in the Arctic, and some beyond, have recently increased 
their focus and activities in/towards the region, illustrated by national 
security strategies, revised Arctic strategies, grown policy commitment 
to the Arctic, and troop and military equipment deployments. Human 
activity will generally grow too. With states bolstering security and 
defense capacities, actual conflict becomes more likely. Climate change 
effects, states’ resource interests, and security concerns may result in 
incentives for claiming and acquiring territory and resources in 
attempts to secure both interests and influence.25 While perceptions of 
security in the Arctic are no longer only of military nature, the presence 
of hard security issues continues to shape the region.26 Despite the 
achieved level of cooperation, traditional security concerns, as in hard 
security and geopolitical terms, do remain and may even rise. Some 
explore the above-mentioned possibility of a security dilemma 
developing in the Arctic.27 Even though the region has exhibited a 
rather low level of tension up until now, state actions seem to have 
created at least the beginnings of a security dilemma.28 Such a logic 
likely strengthens risk representations and motivates further actions 
perceived by others as confrontational.  
 
A further problem in this picture is that the regional cooperative 
structures and governance mechanisms regarding security and conflict 
resolution are underdeveloped. Some argue that the polar governance 
regimes have proven quite resilient.29 Others, however, point to clear 
deficits, especially when it comes to security aspects. For example, 
UNCLOS has shown weaknesses in dealing with security questions that 
spill over into Arctic cooperation, such as the Ukraine Crisis; there was 
no mechanism for it. UNCLOS also does not provide extensive 
governance. Regarding (new) territorial claims, it can only examine 
such claims, but not decide them or implement decisions. The AC, as 
regional intergovernmental forum of exchange and coordination, has 
no decision-making power, and its mandate excludes security. Yet, 
military strategies shape the Arctic’s geostrategic environment.30 
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Furthermore, there are attempts of geopolitical ordering in the Arctic, 
including via threat images of other states.31 The growing presence of 
military aspects, security challenges, and geopolitical ordering – in the 
context of significant transformations – may unsettle Arctic stability. In 
the last years, the Arctic states have opposed attempts by other states to 
internationalize the Arctic, promoting instead regionalization where 
they themselves can foremost shape developments.32 Such moves show 
a continued and even rising importance of national approaches and 
national interests in the region, which can endanger stability and 
security.  
 
Risk Representations  
 
While there is the legal construction of Arctic space, risk 
representations can potentially undermine it, and facilitate tension. In 
light of some Arctic coastal states increasingly acting to safeguard their 
sphere of influence, risk representations about feared rivals are highly 
problematic. This section outlines how the coastal states of Canada, the 
United States, and Russia engage in risk representations. For all three, 
the Arctic figures as significant space in terms of national interest 
promotion. They are the coastal states most active in discourse and 
actions vis-à-vis the Arctic and partly each other. Canada and the 
United States particularly highlight their concern for security, defense, 
and territorial sovereignty. Seeing the Arctic as crucial to their security, 
they claim full freedom of access and of navigation. Both have 
increased their activities in the region, including patrol and 
surveillance.33 In addition, both tie their national identity more closely 
to the Arctic, as the following parts illustrate. As for Russia, the country 
has key interests in a Russian sphere of influence and resources. 
Warnings against other states expanding influence at Russia’s expense 
have grown.  
 
Canada 
 
Risk representations in Canada reflect “a heightened urgency” in the 
Arctic, because access to new resources and new shipping lanes will 
likely intensify conflicting interests and result in sovereignty fears and 
security challenges.34 Canada is expressing a strong concern over 
Russia advancing further into the Arctic and attempting to chip away at 
the Canadian sphere of influence, raising concerns over sovereignty 
and territory. In the Ukraine crisis, Canada reacted especially strong 
against Russia, among others by boycotting Russian-chaired AC 
meetings.35 Canada sees further risks in Russian plans of sole NSR 
control. Implementation of this could exacerbate the already existing 
controversy on the Northwest Passage being international or internal 
Canadian waters. Canada has defined the Northwest Passage as 
internal waters and considers any unauthorized passage by other states 
as violation of sovereignty.36 Some see no immediate peril to the 
Canadian position as of now, as there will be no reliable sea route in the 
Canadian Arctic for the coming years, and as Russia’s refuting of the 
Canadian position would weaken its own position on the NSR.37 
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Nevertheless, the future status of the Northwest Passage remains 
unclear, motivating uncertainty and fears regarding territory and 
sovereignty. The example of the passages pinpoints risk 
representations and the strong concerns over spheres of influence 
between Canada and Russia in particular, which still await a solution. 
 
Canadian discourse understands and constitutes the Arctic region as a 
highly significant space for Canada. The Arctic is Canada’s northern 
frontier, and tightly linked to Canadian sovereignty, security, and 
defense. Aside from the issue of passages, also the claims of Arctic 
coastal states on the (boundaries of) extended continental shelf lines 
carry conflict potential, as do the hopes regarding new resources. Some 
see sufficient vulnerability to “unauthorized and undetected activities” 
by other states, which would risk Canadian Arctic sovereignty. The 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has the 
mandate to control also the Arctic space and to warn and respond to 
military threats there. Canada’s indefinite extension of NORAD’s 
command agreement, in cooperation with the United States, illustrates 
the significance of the Arctic as Canada’s northern frontier, the strong 
spatial element, and the strategic interest. Another indication of the 
importance of the Arctic space to Canada is that Canada has made it 
mandatory for foreign ships to register with the Canadian Coast Guard 
agency that is tracking ships. Canada has even increased its jurisdiction 
regarding environmental agreements on water pollution in its waters.38 
The latter two measures highlight intensified Canadian concern over 
incursions into its maritime space and considered sphere of influence, 
and the goal of strengthening Canadian control over it. Furthermore, 
Canada initiated a scientific survey to prepare a submission for the 
continental shelf coverage in the Arctic, in order to get all of its 
continental shelf recognized, as stated by former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Nicholson.39 This action illustrates the strong spatial 
construction of the Arctic as sphere of influence, which Canada must 
then protect.  
 
The Arctic also figures strong in Canada’s national identity. The Arctic 
identity element has its basis in geography and the country’s historic 
ties to the region, but also in security concerns – as the rough Arctic 
was always a natural barrier.40 “The North is central to Canadian 
national identity” and closely tied to Canada’s heritage and destiny, 
according to the 2009 Northern Strategy.41 The rugged and cold 
northern terrain, linked with freedom and opportunity, frames 
Canada’s national identity. Therefore, some argue that regional control 
and influence are paramount for Canadian identity.42 Seeing 
themselves as “northern nation,” the Arctic is “an expression of our 
deepest aspirations: our sense of exploration, the beauty, and the 
bounty of our land, and our limitless potential.”43 Recently, decision 
makers restated the commitment to the Arctic as part of national 
identity.44 The orientation towards the protection of national interests 
in Canadian representations of the Arctic has grown.45 Canadian 
discourse illustrates the significance of space and identity as part of risk 
representations in the Arctic. 
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United States 
 
Risk representations in the U.S. focus on the Arctic as the “new 
geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape” that will affect American 
security; there is great uncertainty as to whether there will be 
cooperation or great-power competition.46 U.S. decision makers see the 
Arctic linked with multiple states’ geopolitical calculations, which foster 
regional competition, dissent, and militarization, and directly affect 
U.S. national security.47 A key motivator for this view is climate change. 
In United States discourse, climate change is transforming the region’s 
“harsh” environment and polar ice and thereby directly weakening the 
“physical barrier” to the U.S. homeland and risking security. The 
growing access to the Arctic and increasing human activity present a 
further great concern.48 Discourse expresses fears regarding territory, 
sovereignty, and security. Growing economic and political activity of 
other states likely will foster contestation. For example, growing 
maritime traffic could make the Bering Strait into a “strategic 
chokepoint” – causing the United States to monitor the region more 
closely.49 Further concerns relate to a thawing permafrost that results 
in softened, boggy ground jeopardizing roads, pipelines, and 
infrastructures.50 Risk representations express strong concerns that 
climate change results in eased access to U.S. territory and sphere of 
influence, and multiple issues of contestation. There is furthermore the 
spatial construction of the Arctic as zone of protection of U.S. territory 
and security – and the growing fears that eased access to the Arctic will 
endanger national security. In this context, the special relationship and 
the cooperation with Canada on Arctic leadership are important for 
U.S. security.51 U.S. risk representations then express a clear link 
between climate change and security in a frame of national security and 
territorial defense.  
 
The Arctic has gained strategic importance for the United States in the 
last years, expressed in a grown focus on the region in discourse and 
policy. There is a recognition of the acute changes in the Arctic and 
their impact on the country. Risk representations have a sense of 
urgency. They portray the region “at a strategic inflection point” – and 
seeing both coastal states and non-Arctic states positioning themselves 
to seize new opportunities, the United States calls for cooperation that 
benefits U.S. interests and security.52 New opportunities and interests 
also relate to resources. Documents express the readiness to protect 
U.S. national interests and the homeland from risks in the Arctic, in 
cooperation when possible but unilaterally when necessary – via 
ensuring an unhindered ability of U.S. manoeuver in the seas and 
surrounding airspace.53 While the United States Coast Guard is 
currently not well equipped to protect U.S. Arctic interests, discourse 
highlights its important role. To safeguard U.S. sovereign rights in the 
Arctic, “the Coast Guard will exercise and assert U.S. sovereignty where 
necessary, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, security of 
U.S. Arctic waters, and integrity of sovereign borders.”54 The Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard work to keep “adversaries from 
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leveraging the world’s oceans against us,” and maintain unrestricted 
U.S. access to Arctic waters.55 These statements illustrate 
representations of U.S. influence at risk, and a spatial framing of the 
Arctic as sphere of influence and room for unhindered action for 
national interests and security. The importance of the Arctic’s spatial 
dimension is also visible in efforts to expand the continental shelf. To 
access the continental shelf off Alaska, projected to extend for more 
than 600 nautical miles, the United States plans to ratify UNCLOS.56 So 
far, they have only signed it. 
 
Discourse also shows linkages between U.S. national identity and the 
Arctic, although less strongly than in the case of Canada. Official 
documents highlight elements of an Arctic identity and the ideas of 
frontier and pioneer spirit. The United States is “an Arctic Nation,”57 
and the Artic is framed as frontier, as “one of our planet’s last great 
frontiers” – with the U.S. “pioneering spirit … naturally drawn” to it.58 
The United States National Security Strategy defines the country as 
“Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic 
region” – and emphasis lies on national interests and security.59 With 
“the emerging maritime frontier of the Arctic” enlarging the operating 
area and the United States being a “maritime nation,” the Arctic as 
sphere of influence gains importance.60 References to the frontier and 
pioneering spirit strongly resonate with U.S. national identity, and 
express the space-identity nexus. In agreement with scholars, it 
becomes visible how such representations facilitate the expansion of 
reach and influence beyond U.S. borders.61 The Arctic representation as 
sphere of influence and the argued need to protect interests fit with 
U.S. national identity, illustrating the American exceptionalism and 
assertion of global leadership. Discourse expresses strong risk 
representations of an urgency regarding the need to protect and defend 
interests and security, with a space-identity nexus. 
 
Russia 
 
Risk representations of Russia express a new and recently grown focus 
on the Arctic region. Both the updated maritime strategy of 2015 and 
the Arctic strategy of 2013 illustrate the increased importance of the 
region. In line with Russia gearing up to strengthen its influence in the 
Arctic, there was the planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole in 
2007 – a symbolic claim to space and territory, or act of spatial 
ordering. Behind the expanded focus on the Arctic are economic and 
resource interests, and more recently heightened strategic and national 
security concerns. Russian discourse sees the Arctic as key resource 
base and sphere of influence. In contrast to Canada and the United 
States, the Arctic seems to be less important for national identity; there 
are no clear references to this. 
 
In 2008, then-president Medvedev adopted the Russian Federation 
Policy for the Arctic to 2020.62 The document raised the Arctic’s 
significance for Russia’s economic development, safety and security, 
and national interests; it proclaimed the Russian goal of being a leading 
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Arctic power by 2020.63 In 2013 at the Russian Ministry of Defense, 
president Putin warned of an existing Arctic militarization, which was 
endangering Russian security.64 In 2014, he warned that Russia faces 
new risks and challenges from changes in the world and new social and 
economic conditions. He stated that Russia would act to protect its 
national interests also in the Arctic. He raised the “need to strengthen 
our military infrastructure,” to strengthen security at Russia’s Arctic 
borders, and to protect economic interests in “this promising region.” 
Russia would also protect its territorial rights in the resource-rich 
Arctic shelf in order to “safeguard each parcel.”65 Thus, Russian risk 
representations see Arctic developments becoming acute, creating 
concerns over resources, but also territory and security. The Maritime 
Doctrine of 2015 furthermore highlights the links between the Arctic 
and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the Arctic’s importance for 
Russia’s territorial defense via its Northern Fleet. Russia is increasingly 
seeing the Arctic as strategically important. This fits well with the goal 
of strengthening the Northern Fleet’s defense capacities, and the 
protection of Russia’s Arctic interests, called for in the Military 
Doctrine of Russia in 2014.66  
 
When considering the Russian northern coast, the importance of the 
Arctic to the country and its role in risk representations become quite 
clear. About 7000 km coastline and several rivers going inland connect 
the region with the country. Even others recognize the Arctic’s central 
economic importance.67 Furthermore, Russia is factually mostly 
controlling the NSR, having its icebreaking fleet present for the winter 
months. Other states thus fear unforeseeable cost increases, which is 
among the reasons why they reject Russian plans for sole NSR 
administration. Russia’s Policy for the Arctic to 2020 states the 
intention to use the NSR for its international navigation under its own 
jurisdiction and for the benefit of national interests.68 Seen from a 
spatial perspective, factual NSR control would give Russia a means to 
expand its sphere of influence in the Arctic, potentially at the cost of 
others. Other coastal states though warn against such steps.69 The 
representation of the Arctic as Russia’s resource base also illustrates 
attempts at spatial ordering and a sphere-of-influence approach, 
motivated by concerns over resources, territory, and security. Russian 
risk representations and interests in the Arctic though collide with 
those of Canada and the United States. The next section pinpoints 
existing conflicts of interests and the actions that coastal states take to 
defend their interests and address security concerns. 
 
Conflicts of Interests and Confrontational Actions 
 
Canada 
 
Underlining its view of the Arctic, Canada has implemented numerous 
measures to bolster its position in the region, including for increased 
effectiveness of control and protection against threats.70 The 
implementation of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy of 2013 included the 
introduction and/or strengthening of additional measures.71 Canada 
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has especially bolstered its surveillance, patrol, and interception 
capacities.72 Canada is concerned particularly with its sovereignty and 
security. To safeguard Canadian Arctic sovereignty, the Canadian Arctic 
seabed was to be comprehensively mapped, aerial surveillance 
increased, patrol ships added, Arctic Rangers increased and 
strengthened, and the Canadian military forces modernized. Activities 
also include the building of a new Arctic research station. Already the 
Northern Strategy from 2009 called to meet the growing international 
interest in the Arctic with both strengthened Canadian patrol and 
presence in Arctic land, sea, and skies, aiming at a stable Arctic that 
benefits and secures Canada.73 
 
The Canadian perspective includes another key challenge, namely how 
to prevent an Arctic arms race. While the states within the Arctic Circle 
continually state their goal of cooperation, their articulated objectives 
to protect their interests and supporting actions show otherwise. With 
notable increases of some states’ military capacities in the region, 
Canada sees reason for alarm regarding its sovereignty and security. 
Furthermore, the United States and Russia have not ended their Arctic 
nuclear operations, only reduced them, and Russia is modernizing its 
Northern Fleet for stated defense purposes. There is thus a “distinct 
possibility of accidental launch of nuclear weapons” by both states.74 
Arguably, this U.S.-Russian context also has an inherent escalation 
dynamic; a deterioration of relations could then trigger escalation. This 
reminds of a potential security dilemma, as stated above, and 
illustrations how risk representations and actions interact. As more of 
the Arctic becomes ice-free, both countries, and others, will likely 
expand their presence in the region for their benefit – increasing the 
potential for the collision of interests in resources and influence. 
 
Canada shares some points of contention towards Russia with the 
United States. Both strongly reject any Russian efforts for the military 
protection of its Arctic energy and security interests, as well as Russia’s 
troop increases in the Arctic.75 Neither country has come forward on 
how to deal with this conflict of interests and the supporting actions up 
until now, pointing to considerable conflict potential. Canada (and the 
United States) has also strongly criticized Russia’s 2007 flag planting 
on the North Pole and responded with an increase of military and 
surveillance capacities. 
 
United States 
 
Recognizing the grown importance of the Arctic to the U.S., activities 
show an increased focus on the region. Key are the protection of U.S. 
national interests in the Arctic, the view of the region as sphere of 
influence, the need to protect national security also via the Arctic, and 
the gains from new opportunities in the region. While the United States 
would cooperate with other actors when useful, cooperation must 
promote national interests. Since Obama’s presidency, the United 
States has increased its Arctic commitment, revised Arctic 
strategiesstrategies, and formulated a more active Arctic policy. 
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Obama’s 2015 visit to the region, as the first sitting U.S. president, 
raised the region’s profile. The “staging” of the region included the 
promotion of U.S. regional leadership and national security.76 The 
country has also used the AC chair role (2015-2017) to influence Arctic 
developments for own benefit.77 Experts furthermore point to other 
countries gearing up to profit from new opportunities in the Arctic.78 
U.S. actions point to an increased Arctic link to national defense and 
security issues.  
 
The United States has therefore strengthened Arctic domain awareness 
and plans to further do so, including with exercises for maritime 
readiness and ice-impacted water operations.79 The country will protect 
interests and counter any challenges to U.S. global mobility and 
security, including “excessive maritime claims” of other states.80 
According to former U.S. Defense Secretary Hagel, the country will 
respond to the “flood of interests in energy exploration” and its effects 
on other Arctic issues.81 Fitting U.S. responses are stability measures 
and security cooperation, but also preemptive means and increased 
military operations.82 These measures highlight the concerns over how 
changes, and other states’ reactions to a changing Arctic, may affect 
U.S. security, and economic and geopolitical interests. Others will likely 
interpret preemptive and military measures as confrontational action, 
to which they may respond in kind, again alluding to a potential 
security dilemma developing. 
 
Specific challengers to U.S. interests and security are Russia and China 
as the “two near-peer strategic competitors.”83 In the current global 
context, the United States has focused on Russia and China as the 
states most threatening national interests.84 While the United States 
has also cooperated with Russia in the region, there are increasing 
points of contention as well as risks from recent Russian actions, 
including larger naval exercises and new military equipment. There are 
also stronger responses to the perceived Russian systematic 
intimidation of forces from NATO and Western European states in the 
Arctic and nearby. Since the Ukraine crisis, the United States has 
notably increased the monitoring of the growing Russian threat 
potential.85 In addition, at a recent AC meeting, U.S. Secretary of State 
Pompeo lashed out at both Russia and China for their more and more 
aggressive behavior.86 Vis-à-vis China, there is an increase in activities 
too. Seeing China as threat to the U.S. ability for norm setting, the 
United States now monitors Chinese behavior more closely.87 Overall, 
U.S. actions, in part certainly confrontational, echo U.S. risk 
representations. 
 
Russia 
 
According to the Policy for the Arctic to 2020, Russia will assure 
sufficient fighting potential to keep its zone of the Arctic a secure space 
for own benefits.88 Russia has modernized its military capacities in 
recent years, fortified its Northern fleet, and conducts regular military 
exercises. Frequency and size of exercises have grown. Its nuclear 
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submarines and intercontinental rockets present significant offensive 
power also to defend its Arctic interests.89 Some argue that much of the 
growing military capacities in the Arctic is not necessarily directed at 
the Arctic.90 Yet, the country is developing anti-access/area denial 
capacities for maritime spaces, including the North Atlantic. Russia has 
notably expanded maritime activities. It has added 6000 soldiers and 
radar and sensing networks in the Murmansk region, reopened ten new 
bases in 2015, plans additional bases in the Arctic, and is buying ice-
breaking vessels. Putin ordered the Russian government and its 
agencies to work to implement Russian Arctic objectives with sufficient 
financial resources.91 Russia has thus come forward with substantial 
backing to safeguard its interests of a secure Arctic. Other states, such 
as Canada and the United States, though consider Russian military- 
and security-related actions confrontational, as addressed above. 
 
The other key aim of Russia is economic development, using the Arctic 
as strategic resource base. In light of an intensifying global resource 
and markets competition, Russia is acting to develop Arctic resources, 
according to the Russian National Security Strategy from 2015. Russia 
plans to turn the region into its key resource base, as stated in The 
Policy for the Arctic to 2020. To foster a climate friendly to its interests, 
Russia also sees frontier and international cooperation a fitting 
measure.92 Russia is leading in Arctic offshore oil production. It has 
significantly increased energy-related investments directed at Arctic 
mapping, and exploration that focus on oil, gas and mining.93 Russia is 
highly dependent on foreign technology, and recent sanctions have led 
to difficulties in pursuing its off- and onshore development of Arctic 
resources.94 Yet, Russia has, with South Korean help, succeeded in 
getting the world’s first liquid natural gas (LNG) tanker that can 
operate in the Arctic all of the year; LNG is projected to gain much 
significance in the future. Russia’s economy depends on hydrocarbon 
exports, making the Arctic reserves essential. Russian oil and gas 
companies are also greatly increasing their spending and exploration.95 
The growing Russian power projection on land and sea, and close 
military encounters with Russian forces increase the potential of 
Russian-Western confrontation in the Arctic.96 Both ecnomic and 
security drivers motivate the actions directed at harvesting resources 
and protecting territory. With risk representations and actions colliding 
with those of other coastal states, actions point to a greater contestation 
and possibly conflict. 
 
The China Factor – A Destabilizer? 
 
Recently, at an AC meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo strongly 
refuted China’s Arctic claims as well as China’s self-claimed near-Arctic 
status, and strongly criticized its behavior in the Arctic.97 China is only 
an AC observer and has no sovereign rights in the Arctic, which is why 
the article here discusses China separate from coastal states. The 
country is, however, a globally rising actor that since a few years claims 
Arctic interests. While China is at a great distance from the Arctic, 
decision makers in Beijing are articulating ever more strongly Arctic 
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interests, and Chinese companies are greatly expanding their Arctic 
activities. The self-definition of near-Arctic state underlines this. China 
can affect the Arctic either directly with own actions or indirectly via 
other states acting in response to Chinese activities in/towards the 
region. Already more than ten years ago, when the coastal states re-
stated their territorial sovereignty over the Arctic in the 2008 Ilulissat 
Declaration, Beijing rejected any exclusion of non- or near-Arctic 
governments.98 This may illustrate Chinese risk representations of 
being ‘left outside’ when it comes to hoped-for new resources and 
influence. To support its Arctic ambitions, Beijing has made it a 
national goal since at least 2013 of becoming a maritime power. China 
aims to utilize the oceans for global power status and development.99 
This view highlights a construction of the Arctic as space in which 
China can implement its goals and interests. Both Chinese discourse 
and actions carry potential for conflict. 
 
In the first policy paper on the Arctic, Beijing outlines its key interests: 
resources, new and/or shorter transit routes, and security.100 Resources 
are to satisfy current needs and guarantee future resource security and 
economic growth. Details of implementation remain uncertain though. 
Some thus describe China’s Arctic interests as “undeclared foreign 
policy” that is only articulated slowly to the outside world.101 To 
strengthen its position, Beijing frames the Arctic as constituting a 
global common, even though the greatest part lies within EEZs. Some 
even see Beijing aiming for a reordering of the Arctic legal regime by 
claiming that resources are global commons, to which China can then 
make its assertions.102 China may also have chosen to circumvent the 
legal constraints by building up influence in the region. In fact, China is 
positioning itself as key partner for multiple states within the Arctic 
region and nearby, and as Arctic stakeholder. As scholars point out, 
Chinese firms make large-scale investment in key development projects 
in the Arctic; construct and renovate ports, airports, and other 
infrastructure; and make large-scale land purchases. They build 
strategic bi- and multilateral relationships; implement cross-regional 
projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that includes an ‘Arctic 
Silk Road’; and advance in related research and technology, including 
the construction of icebreakers.103 The government partly supports and 
promotes these activities.  
 
China’s Arctic and Antarctic Administration states that China cannot 
let others split the resources but must expand own influence in the 
Arctic. This highlights Chinese risk representations, and the linked 
construction of the Arctic full of resources. Chinese firms are building 
up technology and skills for competitive Arctic operation, including 
cargo ships with ice class, and they are among the largest buyers of 
international oil assets, some directed towards the Arctic.104 According 
to a report on Chinese activities of the last years, the greatest part of the 
over 1.4 trillion US$ investment in Arctic states plus Finland and 
Sweden goes into energy and mineral resources.105 Cooperation 
projects exist with Canada, the United States, and Russia, and 
increasingly so with smaller states like Greenland and Iceland, but also 
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Finland and Norway. Some argue that other regions can better satisfy 
Chinese resource interests.106 Yet, China acts to profit from Arctic 
resources, expanding investment and partnerships for a stronger 
foothold in the Arctic and its development. Furthermore, there is 
potential for long-term military conflict.107 China is building a position 
to restrain the coastal states’ room of action, to which they will likely 
react. China’s military modernization, non-transparent military 
intentions, aggressive ways of resolving territorial disputes, and the 
development of anti-access/area-denial, cyber, and space control tools 
directed against the West can foster destabilization and security 
risks.108 China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea is a 
warning of how China implements its interests.  
 
China is also increasing its cooperation with Russia, including on Arctic 
matters. That China is thereby gaining additional advantage vis-á-vis 
the Arctic should be of concern. Intensifying Chinese-Russian strategic 
aligning is another issue that particularly worries Canadian and U.S. 
decision makers, along with the growing possibility of China and Russia 
together effectively challenging the U.S.-Western global order.109 China 
and Russia have intensified their relations in many areas, and to depths 
not expected by observers.110 Aside from growing economic and 
resource cooperation, both countries cooperate on advanced military 
technology, including a nuclear-operated aircraft carrier. For now, both 
sides benefit. Russia needs China also for financing, especially since 
Western sanctions have cut revenues. China stepped in to save Russia’s 
Yamal LNG project, but thereby strengthened its own position. Soon, 
China may outcompete Russia and constrain Russia’s Arctic influence, 
which could destabilize regional relations. While China has been 
careful to act cooperatively and avoid open tension over Arctic matters, 
closer cooperation with Russia enables China to exert influence in the 
Arctic. Some argue that Chinese behavior may depend on how soon 
there will be ice-free passages, and on the country’s evolving 
international role.111 The United States, and others, should work to 
soften the negative effects on U.S. and western interests.112 China will 
likely use its growing influence wherever possible, over time also with 
increased confrontation. Already now, risk representations express 
Chinese fears of its interests threatened by others. Coastal states are 
already including China in their risk representations. All sides are 
responding with more or less confrontational actions, pointing to how 
risk representations and actions inform each other. It thus becomes 
essential to find appropriate ways to deal with China in the Arctic, also 
to reduce risks to Arctic stability. 
 
Conclusion: Rising Conflict Potential in the Arctic 
 
Risk representations and confrontational actions by Canada, the United 
States, and Russia point to a rising conflict potential in the region. With 
non-Artic China expanding its foothold in the region, future Arctic 
stability becomes even more uncertain. Risk representations and 
confrontational actions inform each other. On all sides, there are then 
approaches towards the Arctic as sphere of influence that primarily 
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serve national interests. Risk representations include constructions of 
space and identity vis-à-vis the Arctic. Thus, Canada and the United 
States see themselves as northern nations that conquer and protect 
their frontier with their pioneering spirit. In the case of Russia, the 
identity aspect is not clearly present. All three though show a strong 
spatial construction of the Arctic for economic exploitation, geopolitical 
influence, and/or security. Whereas non-Arctic China also shows no 
clear identity aspect, it shares the construction of the Arctic as space for 
opportunity and gain, in the Chinese case for resource exploitation, 
shipping, and geopolitical influence. Risk representations on all sides 
show concerns and fears for national interests and/or sovereignty and 
security. They also express an increasingly determined or even 
aggressive rhetoric regarding the protection of national Arctic interests. 
Risk representations materialize in confrontational actions, creating a 
growing potential for actual conflict. Thus, relations between Canada 
and the United States on the one side and Russia and China on the 
other side are becoming more fragile. Tension over developments 
outside the Arctic can exacerbate fragile relations. Hopes and claims 
over new resources and shipping routes but also security concerns 
bring further uncertainty, and the increasingly influential China, 
building its foothold in the Arctic, can unsettle stability, too. In such a 
context, actions may escalate. Growing conflict potential should not be 
underestimated, especially since existing means of governance and 
cooperation are not sufficiently prepared to manage conflict.  
 
Which measures can suitably address rising conflict potential from risk 
representations and confrontational actions? There is a need to make 
risk representations and how they interact with actions more 
transparent. Coastal states and the Arctic Eight need to articulate and 
share what they perceive as threatening to their interests, and why. It is 
important to express and explain the underlying motivations and fears, 
including the spatial and identity aspects. With an understanding of 
what motivates each other’s actions, actors can reflect on how they may 
contribute to tension. While conflicts of interest are common in 
interstate relations, it is important to understand how risk 
representations can harden positions and intensify conflicts of interest. 
Risk representations can facilitate escalation – the more when there is 
not sufficient awareness of them. Aside from making risk 
representations, transparent, future Arctic stability needs tools to 
address confrontational actions. They should include early warning 
indicators and the fast evaluation of security-related developments. 
Also developments below the level of conflict need to be addressed, 
such as the pausing or stop of agreed cooperation measures, increases 
in surveillance, and instances of threat-making. As the Arctic moves 
closer to the opening of new resources and transport routes, 
functioning means for conflict prevention and management should be 
in place. 
 
As risk representations and confrontational actions in the Arctic also 
include non-Arctic China, ways to deal with Chinese interests and 
actions are needed to manage conflict potential. A sustainable 
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regulation of security issues will require the maintenance of the respect 
for sovereign rights of coastal states. At the same time, coastal states 
cannot ignore the growing Chinese foothold in the Arctic. Arctic states 
must then develop workable ways of including China at some level of 
responsibility and gain. Maintaining sovereign rights of coastal states 
and still integrating China in some manner presents a considerable 
challenge yet unanswered. A sensible way of doing so will require legal 
expertise and mechanisms, which other articles must discuss. 
Furthermore, the case of China touches on questions of how to deal 
with the global common, with climate change having extra-regional 
impact, and the interests of other non-Arctic states. These larger 
questions are of a global nature, and they will move more into the 
foreground in the coming years. While there are no clear and agreed 
answers yet, any decisions and measures attending to this should tie 
the sharing of gains to a sharing of responsibility.  
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